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Abstract 
This article analyses the effects of the current socio-economic crisis on, and recent 
measures in the field of, labour law in Ireland. As one of the ‘programme’ countries, 
which has sought and recieved financial support from the Troika of the International 
Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission, Ireland has 
been required to follow a wide-ranging programme of measures designed to restore 
the economic health of the country. This article looks at specific measures taken in 
the sphere of labour law and policy, in the private and public sectors, placing these in 
the context of the wider EU picture.   
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1. Introduction 
‘This is a significant day, that many thought, and some feared, would never be 
reached. The effort of the Irish people in working towards this goal has been 
unprecedented. Having been frozen out of the financial markets three years 
ago, we have now successfully laid the foundations for exiting the EU/IMF 
programme on December 15 of this year and for making a full return to the 
markets. Over 260 actions have been completed under the programme. 
Stability has been restored to the public finances, the economy is growing, 
and most importantly, over 3,000 jobs are being created each month. Over 
the course of the programme, a wide range of structural reforms have been 
introduced across the public service, the economy and the financial system’. 
 
The words of the Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan, on  7 November 2013, as 
Ireland ‘successfully concluded the 12th and final review mission of the Programme 
with the EU Commission, the ECB (European Central Bank) and the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund)’.1 The Minister’s words, and the majority of the more 
than 260 ‘actions’ referred to, concentrate on economic and financial reforms (in 
particular, relating to the banking and finance sector). This article focuses primarily, 
though, on the ‘structural reforms’, as they relate to labour law and policy in Ireland. 
The article concentrates on two areas in particular; reform of sectoral wage-setting 
mechanisms and reform of public sector labour relations. The article proceeds as 
follows. In the next section, the ‘Irish model’ of industrial relations and labour law is 
outlined. The article then goes on to examine some of the specifics of the Irish crisis 
(although briefly, as they are, by now, relatively well-known and understood), and the 
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role and demands of the Troika of the International Monetary Fund, European 
Central Bank and European Commission will be outlined. The next sections examine 
the impacts of the Troika-demanded reforms on wage-setting mechanisms in Ireland 
and on employment conditions and standard-setting in the public sector. The article 
concludes by reflecting on the likely legacy of these reforms for Ireland, in the 
context of the wider EU picture.   
 
2. The Irish Model (or the ‘Model Irish’…?) 
The Irish system of employment relations has traditionally been classified as 
‘voluntarist’, where the role of the State is primarily to provide a supportive 
framework for collective bargaining (rather than to regulate the labour market by way 
of legislation).2 Whilst, in the last two decades or so, a number of developments, 
notably the decline in trade union density and workplace presence since the 1980s 
and the obligations of EU membership, has resulted in a large volume of labour 
legislation being passed, the vast majority of legislative measures provides for rights 
in respect of individual workers.3 In terms of collective labour law, voluntarism, in the 
Irish context, means that there is no obligation on employers to recognise a trade 
union for collective bargaining purposes and collective agreements are generally not 
legally binding.4 Agreements are enforced through industrial relations (IR) 
negotiations and, if necessary through displays of IR ‘muscle’ (strikes or lock-outs, 
for example). Collective bargaining in Ireland, thus, is seen as normative; collective 
agreements are usually not legally enforceable, as they do not generally intend to 
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 Hyman, R., ‘Industrial Relations in Europe: Theory and Practice’ European Journal of Industrial 
Relations (1995), 1(1), p. 17. 
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 Doherty, M. ‘Developments in Legal Scholarship: Labour Law’, in Mohr, T and Schweppe, J. (eds) 
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create legal relations.5 As a general rule, only the parties to an agreement are bound 
by its terms; concluded collective agreements do not produce erga omnes effects. 
However, some important qualifications to this position must be noted. 
Collective agreements can be given legal effect if such agreements are registered 
with the Labour Court (known as Registered Employment Agreements; REAs).6 
Although these can be individual agreements between a particular employer and its 
workers, in practice, REAs at the sectoral level, made between the main employer 
body representing employers in the sector and the trade unions representing 
workers in the industry, have traditionally been the most significant (particularly in the 
construction sector). Registered Employment Agreements apply to all employers and 
employees working in a particular sector or industry irrespective of whether such 
employers or employees were, in fact, parties to the agreement or wished to be 
subject to its terms. In addition, Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) provide for the 
fixing of minimum rates of pay and the regulation of employment in certain sectors 
where there is little or no collective bargaining and where significant numbers of 
vulnerable workers are employed (e.g. retail, catering and hotels).7 JLCs, which 
comprise of an independent chairperson, appointed by the Minister, and 
representative members of workers and employers, propose Employment Regulation 
                                               
5
 Goulding Chemicals Ltd. v Bolger [1977] IR 211. See Holland v Athlone IT [2011] IEHC 414, where 
the High Court held that the Public Service Agreement 2010-2014 (the ‘Croke Park Agreement’), 
made between public sector unions and management, could not be taken to have created 
enforceable legal rights which are justiciable in law at the hands of an individual public sector 
employee. Hogan J held that the language used in the agreement applied in the political and industrial 
relations sphere, but not the legal sphere, and that the parties had never intended to create legal 
rights. 
6
 Part III of the Industrial Relations Act 1946 (as amended); this legislation has been the subject of a 
recent court challenge, discussed further below. Note that, despite its moniker, the Irish Labour Court 
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representatives of unions and employers, and chaired by a government nominee. The Labour Court, 
depending on the nature of the dispute before it, may grant legally binding ‘determinations’ or 
‘recommendations’, which are not legally binding. 
7
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Orders (EROs), which, when confirmed by the Labour Court, set legally binding 
minimum wages and conditions of employment for workers in the sectors covered. 
Prior to 2011, EROs provided: for minimum sectoral rates of pay in excess of the 
national minimum wage; for sectoral pay scales, based on length of service and skill 
level; for sectoral overtime payments and premium payments to those required to 
work on Sundays; and for benefits for employees in the relevant sectors that were 
not imparted by general labour legislation (most notably, a right to sick pay). Thus, 
both the REA and JLC systems represent a significant departure from the Irish 
(indeed, Anglo-American) norm,8 in that terms and conditions of employment are not 
settled through direct contractual negotiations between the employer and its workers. 
Instead, in Ewing’s terms, these systems approximate a ‘regulatory’ model of 
collective bargaining that is premised on the idea that trade unions are involved in a 
process of rule-making that has an impact beyond their members (or members’ 
immediate colleagues). Here, collective bargaining takes on an explicit public role, as 
employment standards are set, and applied, not only for employers that recognise 
trade unions and union members, but for enterprises which do not engage in 
collective bargaining.9 
Voluntary bargaining at national level was a hugely important feature of labour 
relations in Ireland between 1987and 2010. During this period, a series of social 
pacts was concluded between the social partners; the State; the unions (represented 
by the only trade union confederation, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions- ICTU); 
and the employers (represented primarily by the main employers’ association, the 
Irish Business and Employers Confederation- IBEC- but also by sector specific 
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 Bogg, A. The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (Oxford, Hart, 2009). 
9
 Ewing, K.D. ‘The Function of Trade Unions’ Industrial Law Journal (2005), 34(1), p. 1. 
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groups, like the Construction Industry Federation).10 The social pacts each ran for 
three years, focusing on issues of pay (for the public, and unionised private, sector), 
tax reform and a range of other socio-economic issues.11 Thus, the Irish trade union 
movement (and the main employer’s representative groups) had a strongly 
institutionalised, and State-sanctioned, role in national socio-economic governance. 
The bargaining and implementation processes under the ‘social partnership’ process 
were voluntary, with unilateral withdrawal by any party possible at any time; in 
particular, the government was free to treat the agreements as advisory documents 
choosing which issues to fully implement, subject, of course, to industrial relations 
and political considerations. However, a number of key labour law measures were 
agreed, which were then progressed through the normal legislative process; for 
example, legislation on a national minimum wage,12 and throughout the period, 
agreements between public sector management and trade unions on public sector 
pay, reform and management measures were agreed and, almost without exception, 
implemented. The social partnership agreements also contained industrial peace 
clauses, and an elaborate institutional structure for the resolution of disputes relating 
to their interpretation or implementation. The Irish social partnership model attracted 
a wave of attention from academics and policy-makers all over the world,13 which 
focused on how Ireland, with its historically antagonistic, fragmented Anglo-Saxon 
industrial relations system, was capable of maintaining such a distinctive, corporatist-
style system of socio-economic governance. Furthermore, the social partnership era 
coincided with the ‘Celtic Tiger’ period of astonishing growth in wealth creation and 
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 All of the agreements can be accessed at 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/ (accessed 20 November 2013). 
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 See Doherty, M. ‘It Must Have Been Love…But It’s Over Now: The Crisis and Collapse of Irish 
Social Partnership’ Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research (2011), 17(3), p. 371. 
12
 The National Minimum Wage Act 2000.  
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 See, for example, Baccaro, L. ‘The Constitution of “Democratic” Corporatism in Italy’ Politics and 
Society (2002), 30(2), p. 327. 
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employment.14 It seemed that Ireland had struck labour relations gold; a model that 
allowed employers free reign (legally speaking) in their choice to deal, or not ,with 
trade unions, but which incorporated the trade union movement in processes of 
socio-economic governance. Not only that, but, in a country accustomed to high 
unemployment rates (approximately 20% in the late 1980s), high levels of emigration 
and decades of economic stagnation, here was a model that delivered 
unprecedented economic success, combined with historically low levels of industrial 
conflict.  
 
3. Ooops!…We Did it Again 
As is now well known, all that glittered in Ireland certainly was not gold, and a 
severe economic, financial and social crisis has engulfed the country (and, to varying 
degrees, most of the Western world) over the past five years. After recording real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of more than 5% in 2007, in 2009, real GDP 
in Ireland shrank by the same figure. The unemployment rate rocketed from under 
5% in January 2007 to more than 15% by January 2012 and unemployment in the 
construction sector rose by 60% in just four years from 2008 to 2012.15 In broad 
terms, since 2008, Ireland has experienced a rapid deterioration in the public 
finances, a collapse in the housing market and construction sector, and a liquidity 
crisis for the banking system.16 While international economic events have impacted 
almost everywhere, worries had long been expressed about the light regulation of 
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financial institutions (domestic and otherwise) and an over-heated property market in 
Ireland.17 The ‘bursting’ of national financial and housing bubbles, coupled, crucially, 
with the government's 2008 decision (endorsed by the EU) to State-guarantee all 
banking debt, has resulted in a particularly severe crisis in Ireland.  
The initial response of the Irish government and employers was to seek a 
renegotiation of a wage agreement (providing for modest pay increases) struck in 
2008. However, in March 2009, the government unilaterally introduced an 
emergency budget, imposing pay cuts for all public servants.18 Attempts to negotiate 
a new pact continued throughout 2009 and, in December, appeared to be on the 
verge of successful conclusion. However, a last minute revolt by government 
deputies over aspects of the deal relating to public sector reform led to the 
government withdrawing and the effective end of the Irish social partnership 
process.19 The December 2009 budget again cut public sector pay. In March 2010, 
with the partnership process moribund, the public sector unions and employers 
concluded a new four-year Public Service Agreement (the ‘Croke Park 
Agreement’),20 under which it was agreed to protect public sector pay levels in 
exchange for a reduction in employee numbers and a substantial commitment to 
‘reform’, including the redesign of work processes. Despite considerable opposition 
to the deal amongst, and within, many unions, the Public Services Committee of the 
ICTU accepted the deal in June. In November 2010, the Irish government accepted 
the terms of an International Monetary Fund-EU rescue package, totalling 
approximately €85 billion, outlined a four-year austerity plan, and, in the December 
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 See, for example, the account of Ireland as a ‘financial Wild West’ in the New York Times, 1 April 
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budget, introduced €6 billion of tax increases, new charges and levies and severe 
welfare and public spending cuts  (including a cut in the minimum wage). A general 
election in early-2011 brought a new coalition government to power, which has 
committed to carrying out the terms of the bail-out package. The budgets of 2011, 
2012 and 2013 have introduced a range of further austerity measures (including 
further levies and charges and swingeing cuts to public spending). In 2013, the 
government also announced it wanted to renegotiate the terms of the Croke Park 
Agreement. A deal emerged (commonly referred to as ‘Croke Park Two’), which was 
rejected in a ballot by a majority of public service workers.21 Further negotiations 
produced a modified deal, the ‘Haddington Road Agreement’, which, nonetheless, 
provided for another round of pay cuts, increment freezes and substantial changes to 
working conditions for public servants. At the time of writing, all but one public sector 
trade union (representing secondary school teachers) has accepted the terms of this 
agreement. In the next sections, the changes occasioned by the crisis, and those  
wrought by the terms of the IMF-EU deal, will be examined.  
 
4. Standard-setting, the Troika and the Courts 
A crucial point to make at this juncture is that relative to the demands made of, and 
changes made to, labour law in the other countries featured in this volume, those 
examined in this article almost pale into insignificance. However, this leads to some 
important questions about the approach of the supra-national institutions in question, 
and most notably, of course, about the role of the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank, to which we will return below.  
                                               
21
 http://www.rte.ie/news/2013/0416/381586-croke-park-agreement/ (accessed 20 November 2013). 
 11 
 Nonetheless, the dramatic changes wrought in Spain and Greece do not quite 
have parallels in the Irish case; generally speaking the employment legislative 
framework has remained largely, though not exclusively, intact. The Irish 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed with the Troika and dated December 
1 2010,22 unsurprisingly focuses primarily on measures relating to fiscal 
consolidation and financial sector reforms. However, the MoU does address 
‘structural reforms’ relating to the labour market. 23 The most significant pledge for 
the purposes of this article was to commission an independent review of the REA 
and JLC arrangements, with terms of reference and follow-up actions to be agreed 
with the Commission. This review was to be carried out in order to ensure there were 
no ‘distortions’ of wage conditions across sectors associated with the presence of 
sectoral minimum wages in addition to the national minimum wage. The review of 
the ERO and REA systems was published in May 2011 and recommended reform, 
rather than abolition.24 Before the government took any action, events were 
somewhat overtaken when the Irish High Court declared that the legislation allowing 
the imposition of terms and conditions of employment by means of an ERO was 
unconstitutional.25 The Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation moved swiftly to 
enact new legislation to re-establish, with significant reforms, the ERO/REA systems; 
the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2012. In terms of bolstering, or at least 
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 The 2010 MoU and all subsequent documents relating to Ireland’s bail-out are available at 
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maintaining, legally binding collective bargaining structures (in the case of the REAs) 
and social partner involvement in legally binding wage-setting mechanisms (in the 
case of the JLCs), the decision of the Irish government, with the consent of the 
Troika, to re-establish the ERO/REA systems, rather than simply abolish them, was 
noteworthy. However the provisions of the 2012 Act did come in for some criticism, 
first, for de-prioritising the role of the social partners in negotiating and policing the 
regulation of terms and conditions of employment (the Act vests significant veto 
powers in the Minister of the day), and, secondly, by emphasising the establishment 
of statutory minimum standards in terms of employment rights rather than bargained 
terms and conditions of employment, which seek to improve upon the statutory 
‘floor’.26 It is worth commenting, too, that the enacted legislation ignored the 
recommendation of the ERO/REA review group, set up in accordance with the MoU, 
to establish a well-designed framework where collective bargaining (within the 
meaning of Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and relevant International Labour Organisation – ILO – Conventions)27 could take 
place. The 2012 Act certainly seemed to satisfy the Troika; references to it in the 
MoUs subsequent to its enactment simply required the Irish government to report ‘on 
the impact on the labour market of reforms to sectoral wage-setting mechanisms 
undertaken under the programme’.28  
 However, another key decision of the Irish Superior Courts was delivered 
shortly after the enactment of the legislation. In McGowan & Ors v The Labour Court 
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 Doherty, cit., (n 25). 
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 See C98, The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Rights Convention 1949; C154, The 
Collective Bargaining Convention 1981; and also the Collective Bargaining Recommendation of 1951 
(No 91). 
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 MoU dated November 2012; see n 22, above. 
 13 
& Ors29 the Supreme Court declared Part III of the Industrial Relations Act 1946, 
which established the REA system, and which the 2012 Act purports to amend, to be 
unconstitutional.  The tone of the judgment and the language used by the Supreme 
Court are noteworthy.30 The Court notes (at paragraph 8) that the provisions of Part 
III appear ‘somewhat anomalous’ today and give rise to the ‘prospect of burdensome 
restraints on competition for prospective employers and intrusive paternalism for 
prospective employees’. The fact that the erga omnes extension of collective 
agreements to cover all employers and workers in a sector is a well-established 
feature of employment law systems in a raft of other EU States did not seem 
apparent to the Court. It seems many workers in sectors formerly covered by JLCs 
and REAs (retail, construction, etc.), unless contractually protected, are now covered 
solely by the provisions of minimum wage legislation and other statutory minima 
where these exist. This is certainly the view of the Troika. In its summer 2013 review 
of Ireland, the Commission noted that the 2012 Act now seems inadequate and 
requires ‘fast action’ on a new framework to reinstate: 
 
‘a proper industrial relations management mechanism. Many aspects of the 
2012 reform ought to be preserved, including the increased flexibility and 
consideration given to international competitiveness and relative wage levels 
in the EU, while the scope of REAs ought to be reduced’. 31 
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 [2013] IESC 21. 
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 See Doherty, M. ‘When You Ain’t Got Nothin’, You Got Nothin’  to Lose... Union Recognition Laws, 
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 Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland—Summer 2013 Review, p. 
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accessed 20 November 2013) 
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The Commission also notes approvingly that the Irish authorities aim to avail 
of the new reforms to reduce the number of sectors subject to EROs. Thus, with a 
little help from the Irish judiciary, all is on track. In the private sector, fewer workers 
are to be covered by sectoral terms and conditions of employment that exceed 
statutory minima and trade union involvement in setting legally binding terms and 
conditions of employment is to be reduced.  
 
5. Public Sector Reform (or ‘make them an offer they can’t 
refuse…’) 
‘Ireland has been able to deliver public services with a public sector that is 
relatively small given the size of its economy and labour force. 
 
(Social partnership) has been used as a potent instrument across all sectors 
to ensure the co-operation of Public Service unions with change and 
modernisation objectives, and to sort out industrial disputes…Nationally, 
Social Partnership has also led to a culture whereby consultations on 
significant legislative or policy changes will, as a matter of course, include 
consultation with the Social Partners. At a lower level there is also a growing 
awareness of the need to ensure that the views of business, employees/trade 
unions/citizens, and vulnerable groups, are taken into account when 
examining the implications of proposed policy changes. 
 
 15 
Ireland may want to move towards more delegated pay bargaining.’32 
 
The quotes above from the report into the Irish public service dates from 2008, but, 
according to its authors at the OECD, its main findings remain relevant, even though 
it was undertaken before the economic crisis.33 It is interesting, therefore, to reflect 
on the key approaches to addressing the crisis in Ireland, prescribed by the Troika 
and implemented by two successive Irish governments. Many of the broad 
parameters of the response are set out in the National Recovery Plan 2011-2014;34 
these are subsequently repeated, modified and monitored in the successive MoUs 
with the Troika. The aim is a 9% of GDP budgetary correction over the period. The 
plan provides for fiscal consolidation measures over its lifetime amounting to €15 
billion; €5 billion to come via tax increases and €10 billion to come via reductions in 
public expenditure. The latter are to be achieved, in part by the reduction in numbers 
of public servants in the order of approximately 25,000 and by the generation of 
significant savings through the reform of work practices in the public sector. As of 
yet, compulsory redundancies have been avoided. This is, arguably, the main trade 
union success in the negotiations of the two public service agreements since 2010, 
the Croke Park and Haddington Road agreements. Numbers have been shed 
through early retirements, the non-replacement of departing staff, and a tight 
Employment Control Framework, which sets strict limits on any public sector 
recruitment. Nevertheless, Ireland’s ‘relatively small public sector’ is now smaller 
(and being further reduced) at a time when demands on core public services (in 
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health, education and, particularly in the context of high unemployment, social 
security and welfare) are increasing.  
 In the area of work practice reform, the parameters are set out in the 
Haddington Road Agreement. 35  Unlike the reforms in Greece and Spain, these 
were, at least, negotiated with the public service trade unions (although the 
‘negotiation’ process will be discussed further below). Nonetheless, some of the 
concerns expressed by the other contributors in this volume in relation to the impact 
of the reforms on certain groups, particularly women and those with family 
responsibilities, are echoed here. The Agreement outlines a number of general 
reform principles and goes on to provide further detail on these at a sectoral level. Of 
particular interest to this article are the provisions for: 
 Additional working hours for public servants;  
 greater use of redeployment of public servants (up to 45km from the current 
work location or of the home address); 
 review and reform of work-sharing arrangements, to make operation of the 
system less of a ‘management challenge’; 
 review and reform of flexible work arrangements (flexi-time) to better reflect 
the ‘current needs of public service organisations’.  
On publication of the Agreement, it was quickly pointed out by that the proposals 
could have the potential for a ‘disproportionate and negative impact on women 
employed in the public service’ and could ‘disproportionately disadvantage men and 
                                               
35
 http://per.gov.ie/haddington-road-agreement/ (accessed 20 November 2013). 
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women with caring responsibilities in the public sector’.36 It remains to be seen, in the 
implementation of the Agreement, whether this turns out to be the case, but, clearly, 
the direction of the reform proposals cannot be said to be going in a family-friendly 
direction. It should also be noted here that a series of reforms since 2010 have 
disproportionately impacted on new entrants to the public service (predominantly 
younger workers), who have entered the service on considerably lower salary 
scales, and with inferior pension entitlements, than those previously applicable.  
 The reform measures implemented have, of course, important consequences 
for the national finances, public servants and those dependent on public services. 
However, the manner in which the reforms have been implemented may have even 
more lasting effects. It was noted in section 3, notwithstanding the praise heaped 
upon the social partnership model during Ireland’s ‘boom’ years, that the government 
and employers quickly abandoned the model in 2010. In 2013, the government 
similarly announced it wished to re-negotiate the terms of the 2010 Public Service 
Agreement (Croke Park), which still had at least a year to run. The manner of the 
‘negotiation’ is noteworthy. As noted above the original re-negotiated deal (‘Croke 
Park Two’) was rejected by public sector union members following a ballot.  
Following another round of negotiations, modified proposals were presented to union 
members in the Haddington Road Agreement. This time, the government was less 
inclined to leave matters to the vagaries of trade union democracy. In a remarkable 
intervention, the government published, at the same time as the Agreement 
emerged, what was subsequently enacted as the Financial Emergency Measures in 
the Public Interest Act (FEMPI) 2013. This legislation provides that members of 
unions that refuse to sign up to the Haddington Road Agreement will simply have 
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their pay cut, and terms and conditions of employment altered, by legislation. The 
protections of the Agreement (in relation to no compulsory redundancies, for 
example) will not apply to the members of such unions.37 The ‘culture of partnership’ 
noted approvingly by the OECD, it seems, has somewhat soured.  
 Nor has the OECD’s suggestion of a move to more delegated pay bargaining 
in the public service been accepted. Rather, pay across the public service is 
increasingly being determined by central government and, in particular, by the 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER). Indeed, recent research 
reports that this Department has effectively become that which determines pay and 
general employment terms and conditions for all areas of the public service.38 It 
seems the ‘line’ departments and public sector management in sectors such as 
Health and Education are reduced to merely complying with the demands of DPER. 
Following the banking collapse, in a situation where the majority of the domestic 
banking sector is now State-owned, this applies also to the terms and conditions of 
employees in this sector.39  
Therefore, what can be seen in the conduct of public sector industrial relations 
in Ireland is a move towards centralised, command-and-control governance. The 
Haddington Road Agreement, with its strongly sectoral focus, has weakened the 
trade union centre, particularly the ICTU, and caused tensions between trade unions. 
The government’s unilateral withdrawal from social partnership, unilateral insistence 
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 At the time of writing (September 2013) all but one of the public service trade unions that balloted 
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of the re-negotiation of the original Croke Park agreement, and threats of unilateral 
alteration to public service terms and conditions of employment has greatly damaged 
relations of trust with the unions and with public servants. The implications of this if 
and when Ireland returns to some sort of economic stability remain to be seen; 
clearly, though, the relative industrial peace delivered over the previous quarter of a 
century will be much harder to negotiate in the event of an economic upturn.  
 
6. Conclusions 
‘In short, today is a good day for Ireland and the Irish people. It provides clear 
evidence that determined implementation of a comprehensive reform agenda 
can decisively turn around a country's economic fortunes and put it back on a 
path of sustainable growth and rising employment’.40 
 
We live in extraordinary times. As such, it is no surprise that labour law, like all areas 
of contemporary socio-economic regulation, is undergoing rapid and, potentially, 
transformative change, especially in countries where the crisis has been most deeply 
felt. This article has examined key changes in two areas; sectoral wage-setting in the 
private sector and employment terms and conditions in the public sector. In the 
former, the emphasis of the Troika demands, and the focus of the Irish judiciary, has 
been on moving away from prioritising the role of the social partners in negotiating 
and ‘policing’ regulation of terms and conditions of employment, and moving towards 
                                               
40
 Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro and vice 
president of the European Commission, November 14, 2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-997_en.htm; accessed 20 November 2013). 
 20 
the establishment of statutory minimum standards and away from bargained terms 
and conditions of employment. In the heavily unionised public sector, the move has 
been to downgrade terms and conditions of employment, particularly for new 
entrants, and to move away from a consensual, partnership approach to collective 
bargaining. The Irish government has resisted calls to abolish the sectoral wage-
setting mechanisms in their entirety and has at least, in contrast to the governments 
in Greece and Spain, negotiated a settlement with public sector trade unions. 
Nonetheless, a clear overall pattern can be ascertained.  
 In both areas, the model of the State supporting autonomous social partner 
involvement in setting terms and conditions of employment has been, perhaps 
fatally, undermined. The move is clearly towards setting legislative standards, which 
seem to operate as a ‘ceiling’ rather than a ‘floor’; in the public sector, members of 
trade unions that do not accept the government’s ‘negotiation’ position will simply 
have terms and conditions set by law. Achtsioglou and Doherty have argued that this 
seems to run counter to various guarantees of social partner autonomy under 
European law.41 Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
for example, guarantees the right to form and join trade unions. According to the 
European Court of Human Rights, this encompasses a right not to have prohibitions 
imposed on the freedom of trade unions to engage in collective bargaining.42 Article 
6(3) of the new Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that ‘fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the (ECHR) and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law’. 
Moreover, Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for the right of 
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trade unions to negotiate and conclude collective agreements and, in cases of 
conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike 
action. Lastly, Article 152 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) states 
that the Union ‘recognises and promotes the role of the social partners’ at Union 
level, whilst the Treaty (Articles 153-155) grants the social partners at both Union 
and Member State level unique and privileged roles in the legislative process, 
underlining the importance that the Union gives to collective autonomy as a core 
self-regulating mechanism of industrial relations. However, it has also been argued 
that developments in Ireland are perfectly consistent with recent jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice, which also militates against collective approaches to labour market 
regulation. In a line of judgments, (commonly referred to as the ‘Laval Quartet’) 
Laval, Viking, Rüffert and Luxembourg,43 the Court has severely restricted the rights 
of trade unions (and Member States) to act in order to protect collective agreements 
in cases where the rights of free movement of services or establishment are 
involved. As Achtsioglou and Doherty note: 
 
‘Judicial interventions by the European Court in policy areas that have a direct 
and immediately tangible impact on the lives of citizens, and where national 
arrangements are the product of long-standing social settlements, such as 
industrial relations, will, of course, be controversial and more likely to be the 
subject of popular and/or political resistance. Additionally, however, in Greece 
and Ireland the role played by other EU institutions (especially the 
Commission) in the context of the economic crisis and, in particular, the terms 
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of the economic support packages have clearly damaged public support for 
the EU project’.44 
 
In Greece, Ireland and Spain the various labour law measures undertaken during the 
crisis are likely to have serious, negative, and lasting, implications for popular 
conceptions of democratic legitimacy, and for the process of further EU integration.  
As the contributions to this volume have shown, in each country, the 
underlying causes of the crises, and their impacts, are varied. Furthermore, the 
labour law, labour relations and social policy institutional frameworks differ 
significantly. However, in all cases the ‘medicine’ to be taken has been the same; 
‘structural reforms’ of the labour market, which downgrade collective bargaining 
rights and procedures, and a contraction of the public sector and downgrading of the 
terms and conditions of employment therein. In all three countries, it is arguable, 
certain categories of workers (notably younger workers and females) have been 
disproportionately affected by the reforms. It has already been noted, by contrast 
with the Greek and Spanish cases, that little in terms of legislative reform in Ireland 
was demanded by the Troika, particularly in relation to the general labour law 
framework. The explanation for this, undoubtedly, reflects the comparatively light 
nature of Irish labour law regulation. As noted, where legislation exists, it focuses 
almost exclusively on providing a floor of minimum rights for individual workers. 
Statutory provisions supporting collective bargaining are almost non-existent.45 Thus, 
bargained standards that exceed statutory minima (in terms of pay, working time, 
etc.) have been traditionally achieved by trade unions through the deployment (or 
threat) of industrial action, in the public sector by virtue of the (legally non-binding) 
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public service agreements, or in sectors, like retail and hotels covered by EROs or 
REAs. The last two mentioned, in particular, have been the areas where the Troika 
did demand government action.46 Thus, although Ireland already has a lightly 
regulated labour market,47 it was required to review and reform the few areas of 
regulation that provide for collectively bargained standards and that allow workers to 
benefit from collective representation without having to first ‘trigger’ their rights. 
Achtsioglou and Doherty point out that what is significant ‘is the extent to which 
labour market regulation is to be ‘micro-managed’ by the EU institutions; even in 
relatively “neo-liberal” Ireland’.48  
The words of Commissioner Rehn quoted above, clearly point to Ireland as 
the ‘star pupil’ in this particular class. However, if Ireland is the success story, taken 
together, the contributions in this volume clearly beg the question: after the crisis, 
where next for (what remains of) ‘social Europe’? 
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